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Of Higher Intentions and Lower Expectations – A report about a 
failed survey project on using maqāṣid al-shari‛ah as a means of 
comparative governance research 
 
 
 
Michael Bohlander
*
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Governance is a concept that comprises a number of issues. It is not only about laws or policies and 
their enforcement but also about underlying societal attitudes as the milieu in which the above 
operate. This is especially true when we are looking at a system that is based on an entirely different 
ontology such as Islamic law. Here the societal attitudes are heavily influenced by and overlap with 
religious principles. It is obvious that addressing these underlying religious issues is bound to cause 
tensions, especially when the interrogation of the system is done from a secular point of view. My 
approach to circumventing this hurdle was to look at the so-called Higher Intentions in Islamic law, 
the maqāṣid al-shari‛ah. The maqāṣid, while ultimately based on religious primary sources, the 
Qur’an and the practice of the Prophet Muhammad, the so-called Sunna, have undergone a 
centuries-long refinement process through continuous efforts in Islamic jurisprudence. They have in 
fact almost become ethical principles in their own right, supported by second-order ethical 
implementation principles such as benefit for the public good, public policy etc. which one would 
also find in secular contexts. The idea was therefore to use the maqāṣid as a comparator reservoir of 
rules for comparison with secular ethical principles and second-order implementation rules, and so 
to avoid the religious-secular antagonism.  The way the research project developed and ultimately 
failed is an object lesson about the differences of approach and attitudes to mutually relevant 
academic research and its significance for practical governance in two very different research 
environments.  
                                                 
*
Chair in Comparative and International Criminal Law, Durham University. – I am grateful to the many people who 
attended the three talks where I spoke about the topic of this paper, at Old Dominion University/Norfolk, the Al Mahdi 
Institute in Birmingham and the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in London, and who gave or wrote individual 
comments on the project. I am very grateful to Dawn Rothe and Helen Xanthaki for arranging my talks in Norfolk and 
London. I am particularly indebted to Ali-Reza Bhojani and Sheikh Arif Abdul Hussain of the Al-Mahdi Institute for 
inviting me to speak at their conference on Shari'a Responsibility; Conditions and Conflicts at the Institute from 3 – 4 
April 2014. There was a palpable spirit of wisdom, curiosity and goodwill among all participants, and the milk of 
human kindness – notwithstanding that Lady Macbeth so despised it in her husband – was flowing freely. In such an 
environment, there is no place for the futur al-shari’ah. – I am also grateful to Aurelia Colombi-Ciacchi, 
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, for inviting me to speak to the topic of my research on maqāṣid al-shari‛ah at the 6th 
Annual Conference of the NILG at Groningen. See for the thoughts expressed in that lecture the article in footnote 1 
below. All views and errors are mine alone. 
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For my research leave period 2013/14 at Durham University I had planned to work on a monograph 
related to the potential of using the maqāṣid in Islamic jurisprudence, uncoupled from their 
religious foundations, as a tool for the conversation with secular law and legal thinking, which by 
and large has shed its own religious roots and proceeded to an ethics-driven approach based on 
public policy or interest and/or systemic logical coherence. What do we mean by maqāṣid? Every 
community at some stage develops fundamental guiding principles that inform the interpretation 
and application of morals and laws. In Islam we have the so-called five higher intents or maqāṣid, 
related to protecting five basic values in society, namely religion, life, lineage, intellect and property, 
including ethical principles for the implementation of the five ideals, such as maṣlaḥaḥ murṣala, i.e. 
enhancing the benefit for the public interest, istiḥṣan (juristic preference) the ‘blocking of means’ 
(sadd al-dhari‛ah) and the ban on manipulation (tahayyul) if using lawful means could lead to an 
unlawful or immoral effect, the idea of necessity (ḍarūrāt), etc. Most secular systems do no longer 
recognise the protection of religion and lineage as legitimate purposes per se but are, for example, 
providing for the protection of freedom of religion and speech or the protection of children’s 
inheritance rights even if born out of wedlock. They contain rules for the protection of sexual self-
determination, life and property. Protection of the intellect aspects can be found in laws regulating 
drug and alcohol consumption, the dissemination of (hard) pornography, depictions of violence, etc. 
Secular systems possess similar ethical implementation rules mirroring those in Islamic law, for 
example, the principle of protecting the public interest or public policy, the ban against abuse of 
formal legal positions, necessity, etc. 
My experience from discussions with Muslim friends and colleagues at conferences, symposia, 
lectures and in private conversations also gave me the impression that there was a somewhat 
unfortunate tendency of preferring abstract theorising over practical application, and that the 
conversation was mostly an exchange of monologues about the respective legal systems and their 
theoretical building blocks, rather than a discussion of individual problem scenarios where these 
building blocks could have been observed in action
1
, and a comparative evaluation of their 
                                                 
1
 I have explained the ideas and the related problems of such a discourse at length in Michael Bohlander, Sisters in Law 
– Using Maqāṣid al-Shari‛ah to Advance the Conversation between Islamic and Secular Legal Thinking, (2014) Arab 
Law Quarterly, 257, to which the reader is referred for reasons of space and from which the above paragraph has been 
taken as a modified excerpt. – Further readings on maqāṣid al-Shari‛ah in English can be found e.g. in Muhammad 
Ayub, Understanding Islamic Finance, (Chichester: Wiley, 2007); Muhammad al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Treatise on Maqāṣid 
al-Shari‛ah, translation by Mohamed el-Tahir el-Mesawi, (London/Washington: The International Institute of Islamic 
Thought, 2006); G.E. Attia, Towards Realization of the Higher Intents of Islamic Law, (London/Washington: The 
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007; Yasser Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A 
Systems Approach (London/Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2008); Adis Duderija (ed.) 
Maqasid al-Shari'a and Contemporary Reformist Muslim Thought: An Examination (London; Palgrave MacMillan, 
2014); Ibrahim Ibn Al-Shatibi, The Reconciliation of the Fundamentals of Islamic Law: v. 1: Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul Al-
Shari'a (transl. by Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee) (Reading, Garnet Publishing,  2012); Ahmad Al-Raysuni; Imam Al-
Shatibi's Theory of the Higher Objectives and Intents of Islamic Law (London/Washington: The International Institute 
of Islamic Thought, 2005). 
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reasoning. Case-based discussions very often referred to clearly definable stances of the Qur’an, 
especially when it could be shown that the Islamic era brought in positive innovations, such as for 
example, in the treatment of prisoners of war etc., even if those innovations had in the centuries 
since the composition of the Qur’an and the Sunna been overtaken, for example, by the ethical 
principles in international law. The exposition from the Muslim side was almost invariably 
uncritical, if not apologetic, possibly since the ethical foundations of the modern developments 
seemed to bear the stamp of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
Hence I wanted to initiate a different sort of dialogue that would try to skirt the foundational 
conflict of religious vs. secular and rely only on factual scenarios to which each system, Sunni as 
well as Shi’a Shari’ah2 on the one hand, and two secular systems – Germany and England – on the 
other, would contribute its own case-based answers. The idea behind this was to trace differences 
and similarities in the argument made by the scholars from the respective systems, not so much the 
outcome of it. The premise of the research project, which it meant to verify or falsify, was that 
lawyers largely think the same thoughts and that they use different building blocks to construct 
rather similar-looking houses. The main instrument of the research was a survey questionnaire (see 
Annex I) with a series of case-based scenarios which I sent to a number of Islamic scholars to 
provide the answers to the scenarios from the Shari’ah perspective, since that was clearly outside 
my area of expertise, both in substance and linguistically. There was a possibility to state if a 
respondent was willing to be interviewed. The survey failed in its entirety because I did not get 
(sufficient) answers, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The monograph project was dead on 
arrival, as it were, and so I turned the research into an attempt to find the reasons for the failure – in 
other words, into an attempt of snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. This paper will set out the 
process of preparing the survey and the reflections on why it went wrong. It will reflect on 
comments I received from a number of Muslim and non-Muslim scholars. I do not deny that it also 
reflects my individual reaction to the developments and may from time to time convey a certain 
soupçon of personal frustration; however, I feel that in a sense this is a relevant aspect in its own 
right for the future discussion between academics on all sides to the conversation: The willingness 
from any one side to engage in such modes of collaborative research depends on the clarity of 
communication from potential respondents and the openness as well as the sincerity of the 
discourse.
3
 It is thus important to address matters which may not appear at first glance 
                                                 
2
 We should disabuse ourselves of the idea that there is such a thing as “the” Shari’ah in either of the two major Islamic 
sub-religions, if one wanted to call them that. For a brief modern overview over the different conceptialisations in Sunni 
and Shi’a schools see Jan Michiel Otto (ed.) Sharia Incorporated – A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of 
Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden, Leiden University Press, 2010) 23 ff.   
3
 Due to the personal nature of the communications, the authors have not been identified but given acronyms. Their 
emails are on file with the author. 
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straightforwardly academic in nature but which have – through their wider cultural encoding – a 
direct bearing on the inter-subjectivity of the envisaged research strategy, especially in the context 
of future joint research projects in this area. 
The preparation phase 
The project was the object of a funding application to a UK sponsor institution – which was 
ultimately unsuccessful: with hindsight clearly a blessing given the effect the failure would have 
had on the funding arrangements. In the preparation of the funding application, the project 
justification went through a peer review process within my university. I obtained comments from 
two reviewers, among them a Muslim colleague at Durham, MS1
4
, who stated: 
Many contemporary Muslim scholars are grappling with identifying the appropriate legal theory to 
develop Islamic laws for modern times. One key debate relates to the use of maqasid based approach 
focussing on the maslahah compared to the traditional legalistic approaches that at times fail to 
consider new realities and values. While there is a large literature on maqasid based approach 
(including some contemporary ones mentioned by Michael), the implications of using the principles 
of maqasid during contemporary times is often not clear.  Given this context, the research proposed by 
Michael will be a useful contribution on an important topic. What is distinct about Michael’s proposal 
is that he intends to conduct a comparative study on the maqasid-based Islamic legal theory and 
Western legal approaches. I am not aware of anyone who has done a similar comparative work. In this 
sense, the proposed research is novel.  … 
I think one of the strengths of Michael’s proposed research … would be to examine how the 
principles/concepts that are common in both legal systems (such as blocking the means’ and 
‘precautionary principle’) are applied in Western legal regimes to give clues to how these can be 
applied in the Islamic legal environment.      
Overall, I think the proposed research will help fill gaps on two fronts. On the one hand, it will 
increase the understanding of Islamic legal theory among the Western scholars and on the one other 
hand the research will provide insight to Islamic jurists on how the maqasid related concepts are used 
in modern Western legal thought and practice. This will be possible not only in terms of 
papers/articles that will result from the research, but also through his interaction with Muslim scholars 
while carrying out the work.   
The other, non-Muslim, reviewer provided mainly comments on the presentation of the research 
topic but not on the substance as such. Another Muslim colleague and expert in maqasid research 
from a Persian Gulf institution, MS2, wrote: 
Your research proposal is very much needed for both worlds, Islamic and Western, and I am certain it 
                                                 
4
 MS = Maqasid Survey. 
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will have a good impact, God willing. 
This was echoed by yet another Muslim colleague from a UK university, MS3: 
 
It is a very important project. 
 
After submission of the funding application and obtaining ethics approval by my research 
committee, I began dissemination of the questionnaire to Muslim colleagues, the vast majority of 
whom I had met personally or even knew very well. The text of the accompanying email read as 
follows: 
Dear … 
please find attached a questionnaire for the research project I am conducting on maqasid al shari'ah 
and secular legal theory.  
I am aware that questions 6 and 7 around the issue of sexual relationships out of wedlock may be 
somewhat awkward, but these relate to cases decided in European jurisdictions and there has been a 
long development, so it would be very interesting to see the Shari’ah reaction to them. 
 I'd be very grateful if you could fill it in or refer it to (a) colleague(s) at your institution who could – 
the more the better. You would help me enormously. 
  
I received the following comment from a Muslim colleague at another UK institution, MS4: 
 
I wish you best of luck with the project.  
I don't think you will find two similar answers even from followers of one school of thought for 
number of reasons. Even if they the conclusion may not convey what you wish to see. There are no 
hard and fast rules which follower of particular school of thought would apply when write an answer. 
The situation could be the same even in English law, though would be clearer but not definite. You 
will notice this when you would ask the respondent to explain the reason for answers.  
I have forwarded your questionnaire to a few of my students and staff as well. Let’s see if they 
respond or not.  
 
Neither he nor any of his colleagues did respond, despite a polite reminder. However, this was the 
first inkling I had that there might be a problem with the cooperation from Muslim colleagues. This 
may have had to do partly with a concern that cooperating with a Western institution was fraught 
with potential for the unwelcome attention of the authorities. A colleague from Iran, MS5, replied: 
 
I refer the questionnaire to a group of Iranian lawyers – among them PhD candidates of international 
law-, and then after filling, they will be forwarded to your email. 
Unfortunately, as the infortune consequences of former president and the security approach taken by 
government bodies toward academic staff, some of the respondents prefer not to fill the questionnaire. 
This is the condition for productive academic relations that Mr. Ahmadinejad promised the people. 
Still there are here academics who try to be positive. 
6 
One of the scholars I had sent it to in the UK, MS6, forwarded it to a number of people in his own 
research institution, but already then sounded a note of caution which should be repeated afterwards 
in various fora: 
 
It looks very interesting- although personally I am sceptical about the notion of pure sharia law! 
For me to respond would take me some considerable time - the last five years or so I have been 
focussing on usul al-fiqh rather than fiqh, and I would need to do some serious work on applying my 
methodological ideas across the breadth of questions you are posing. 
But for sure I will forward to other members of our faculty for whom it may be more straightforward 
to respond- although to be honest all may feel that they would have to take out some considerable 
time to do so.  Having said that I hope at least one of us can participate. 
 
Since responses were slow in forthcoming, on 11 December 2013 I sent a reminder to the people I 
had approached so far, and included a few new names: 
 
Please find attached (again) the questionnaire for the research project I am conducting on maqasid al 
shari'ah and secular legal theory. Some of you I will be asking for the first time. 
So far I had only one response from a Shi’a scholar.  
I know that filling in a questionnaire of case-based questions of law is unusual and will take some 
time, but without the questionnaires the research findings will be severely limited.  
I need the input from scholars versed in Islamic law since I have had no formal training in it. The 
survey is an ideal opportunity to move beyond theoretical comparisons to actual case-based work. 
I'd be very grateful if you could fill it in (in English or French) until 15 January 2014.   
If you feel your expertise covers only certain areas of law, then please fill in only the related questions. 
Partial returns are better than none at all. 
You would help me enormously. I repeat that the evaluation will be entirely anonymous. 
  
Overall I had sent the questionnaire
5
 directly to 25 persons, some of whom had offered to pass it on 
to their colleagues; some did pass it on and copied me in, however, I am unaware of the actual 
numbers of referrals to other people. I got responses on the questionnaire as such from three people, 
who happened to be all Shi’a Muslims, and all Iranians: MS5, one of MS5’s colleagues to whom the 
survey had been distributed, both from Iran, and from another Iranian colleague, MS7, from a UK 
                                                 
5
 One of the anonymous reviewers made the suggestion that instead of sending a questionnaire I could have used other 
means of communication, such as Skype or phone conversations etc. While that would in principle have been possible 
with a number of persons – not all respondents will have had a Skype account – the comment does not detract from the 
simple fact that the respondents would still have had to prepare for the conversation because they could not have 
answered the questions off the cuff in any meaningful manner. In addition, using Skype or phone interviews would have 
raised additional research ethics questions because one would have had to record the conversations in order to transcribe 
the material at a later stage, and consequentially it would have created additional problems of anonymity and security of 
data storage etc., not to mention, as we will see below, questions of covert surveillance of the conversation by 
intelligence services and the potential for repercussions from that. 
7 
institution. No Sunni answered the questionnaire
6
. Apart from a Turkish colleague, who had 
misunderstood the substance of the survey and MS4, no-one expressed any concerns, their inability 
or unwillingness; some addressees promised to facilitate a response but never did. The vast majority 
of colleagues did not respond at all. The following table sets out the background and form of 
reaction of the direct addressees. 
 
Table 1 
Regional backgrounds of direct addressees and type of reaction
7
 
 
Background Total number No reaction at all Reaction to 
email* 
Apology  Answered survey 
Arab  12 11 1 0 0 
Iran 4 1 1 0 2** 
South  East Asia 5 3 2 0 0 
Africa 2 2 0 0 0 
Europe 2 1 1 1 0 
Total 25 18 5 1 2 
 
* Means addressees who responded to my email(s) but did neither give an apology nor fill in the questionnaire. 
** One Iranian contact of the direct Iranian addressee also filled in the questionnaire but only gave “Yes” or “No” 
answers without any reasoning, making their response in essence useless. 
 
Post-failure analysis 
 
This outcome called for an attempt at explanation. Not least because from a European collegial 
perspective, the behaviour of the large number of Muslim colleagues who simply did not send any 
reply at all could be considered as bordering on rudeness, or at the very least displaying a lack of 
professionalism.  In order to find a range of possible interpretations of this state of affairs and to 
obtain reactions from uninvolved but knowledgeable colleagues, I presented the development of the 
survey, the reactions I had had so far and my own ideas for the reasons at three symposia in 2014, 
one at Old Dominion University in the USA to a non-Muslim sociologist audience, one at the Al 
Mahdi Institute in Birmingham (UK) to an all-Muslim and overwhelmingly if not entirely Shi’a 
law/philosophy audience, and finally at the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies in London, to a 
mixed but Muslim majority audience. The comments I received
8
 are set out in Table 2. 
                                                 
6
 It would be spurious at this stage based on the available anecdotal evidence to speculate any further about reasons for 
this related to the question of whether the respondents were Shi’i or Sunni. 
7
 The fact that the majority of the questionnaires went to Sunni Muslim countries was determined by the simple fact that 
the persons I had had previous personal contact with mere mostly Sunnis. As explained elsewhere in the paper, personal 
contact is a main determinant for obtaining access to local institutions and colleagues. 
8
 It was not the intention to ascertain the educational and cultural background at these meetings – another suggestion by 
one of the anonymous reviewers – first of all because it would have hindered the free discussion and secondly because 
it would have raised additional research ethics hurdles the efforts at compliance with which would have been out of 
proportion to the potential additional background information, if it had then been provided at all. 
8 
Table 2 
Responses from the audience at symposia 
 
 ODU AMI IALS 
Academic   Systemic approach may 
not have been 
compliant with 
Shari’ah justice9 
 Survey involves 
assumptions about 
systemic coherence, 
does not take into 
account ambiguity of 
systems 
 “further distance to 
travel if outside family 
law” ( focus of 
academic work on 
specific fields of 
practical interest) 
 
Practical  Make Shari’a scholars 
perceive it as their own project 
 Get Muslim scholars to send 
the survey to other Muslim 
scholars 
 Arrange interviews with a few 
individuals 
 Maybe concern over how to 
guarantee anonymity 
 Pay respondents for 
answering 
questionnaires 
 Too much effort 
 No kudos for 
respondents regarding 
their own research 
credit 
 Muslim scholars as 
gatekeepers 
 Questions too difficult 
 Too much effort asked 
 Should have asked 
Muftis as practitioners, 
not scholars 
 Should have used tick-
box version 
 “person to person” 
contact better, not 
abstract approach via 
cold letter 
 Academic competition 
 should have offered 
co-authorship 
 Different format may 
have been required, 
with more explanations 
 Refer to collections of 
fatawa 
Religious/cultural   Phrasing of questions 
may have touched 
sensitive areas (e.g. 
“prostitute”  short-
term marriage) 
 
 Culture precludes 
saying “I don’t know” 
 “does not surprise me” 
– lack of reflection 
among Muslim 
scholars 
 Wording of questions 
may have been 
offensive (e.g. 
“prostitute” offensive 
to women) 
 Shi’a Muslims 
following Ayatollahs, 
esp. on fixed marriage 
 Alternative dispute 
resolution very much 
alive in Muslim world, 
possibly opposed to 
imposed, non-
negotiated decision 
 
Note: ODU = Old Dominion University; AMI = Al-Mahdi Institute; IALS = Institute of Advanced Legal Studies The 
                                                 
9
 Meaning that the secular/Western epistemological framework may not have been suited for Muslim scholars to 
respond in. 
9 
types of comments which I received can summarily be classified as belonging to either an academic, 
practical and/or religious or cultural category. The cultural responses were to a large degree, but not 
only, noticeably focussed on the sexual behaviour questions related to prostitution and cohabitation 
out of wedlock, which chimed to some extent with a comment a Sunni colleague from the UK, MS8, 
had made when commenting in the draft stage on the questionnaire, namely that answering these 
questions might be “embarrassing for younger Islamic scholars”. Muslim members of the audience 
both at AMI (all Shi’a) and IALS took particular issue with the question related to prostitution since 
mainly certain schools of Shi’a law – despite some confusion about its practice in the early Islamic 
period
10
 – allow for short-term or fixed marriages, the so-called nikah mut’ah, that could and often 
are
11
 phenotypically considered as cases of providing sex for money, in other words prostitution, 
from a European perspective. The concern of the members of the audience certainly did not relate to 
the increasing practice of the rebranding of this particular trade under the new, neutral and 
apparently politically correct term “sex work”, which tries to avoid attaching any moral opprobrium 
to these activities. This reaction is rather interesting since all Shari’ah schools clearly forbid 
prostitution as such, most probably even as a hadd crime, so why people picked up on the word so 
strongly is somewhat unclear. Apparently, there was a certain sensitivity among the Muslim 
members of the audience themselves that the use of the fixed-term marriage is in fact nothing short 
of a fig-leaf for allowing otherwise prohibited conduct. 
 
Taking the issues raised by the various comments in turn, the main academic concerns related to the 
question that the survey may have proceeded from a Western or secular epistemological paradigm, 
i.e. it did not take the Islamic system idiosyncrasies into account. This concern is, however, in my 
view unfounded since all I did was to present factual scenarios and to ask the respondents how they 
would solve them in relation to specific legal consequences of those actions, i.e. would there be an 
obligation to pay the contract price or damages etc. The survey did not proceed from any normative 
conception but from the simple assumption that such cases can occur frequently in any jurisdiction, 
and are thus maybe even part of the so-called “textbook scenarios” used in legal education. Hence, 
the questions were entirely open-ended as far as the manner of treating the scenarios was concerned. 
Incidentally, no such comment had been made in the preparation phase of the questionnaire. It was 
precisely in order to avoid engaging with Islamic law directly on a normative or epistemological 
level of debate why the survey was cast as it was, i.e. a sequence of factual scenarios with questions 
attached about a particular legal consequence. The aim was simply to hear how an Islamic scholar 
would argue his or her way through the case and what the outcome would have been, but of those 
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 See Susan A. Spectorsky, Women in Classical Islamic Law, 2012, 92 ff. 
11
 See e.g. the findings of a 2014 parliamentary report in Iran, summarised at www.economist.com/news/middle-east-
and-africa/21611117-official-report-blows-lid-secret-world-sex-throwing. 
10 
two, the argument was the more important part. If the Islamic law approach did not provide any 
solution for the questions asked, then that could have been flagged up and would have provided an 
interesting answer in itself. Therefore, the fact that Islamic legal culture may be in practice more 
negotiation-oriented, as one person suggested, is neither here nor there: Such an answer would also 
have been open to the respondents, and in any event the idea that a legal system may in practice be 
in favour of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms does not absolve that legal system from 
providing a solution if the decision has to be made on a contentious basis because the parties do not 
wish to come to an understanding. For the same reasons, the provision of a tick-box (multiple 
choice?) format, as suggested by one practical comment, was not feasible because a mere Yes or No 
answer would have been useless for the survey’s intentions and open answer text fields would still 
have been required to get at least an idea of the reasons for the answer. 
 
The second academic comment related to the prevalence of work done in a certain field, i.e. family 
law, which is, of course, one of the most relevant as far as modern applications of Shari’ah are 
concerned, along with the law of succession. The idea behind that comment was that many or most 
Islamic scholars worked in those practically relevant fields and thus had no easy way of referencing 
Shari’ah sources in other, less relevant fields of law and to produce answers to the questions within 
an acceptable amount of time and effort. There is naturally a degree of plausibility to that, yet it is 
open to question whether that specialisation should have had the effect of extinguishing any and all 
knowledge of basic principles of the law of contract, tort or criminal law. One outcome of the 
survey, even though not contemplated as such, thus seemed to be that the average Muslim scholar 
does not have such scenarios either at their fingertips or easy access to reference materials, such as, 
for example, meticulously and extensively annotated academic and practitioner codification 
commentaries in civil law jurisdictions, most prominently in Germany. From this point of view, it is 
then unclear what advantage could have been gained from referring to any collections of fatawa, as 
advised in the session at the IALS by way of a practical comment. Would these collections have 
contained annotated entries listed along the abstract and systemic criteria underlying such scenarios 
at all? Or would they just have represented more or less unrelated lists of fatawa loosely put 
together under a general area of law, as one can find often in the traditional hadith collections such 
as Bukhari or Muslim? Only in the former sense would they be of real use. This may be one of the 
fields where Wael B Hallaq’s critique of Shari’ah as not possessing a sufficient degree of 
abstraction may be relevant
12
. That would also resonate with the one rather blunt cultural comment 
which said “does not surprise me” based on an alleged lack of reflection among Muslim scholars. 
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 See Wael B. Hallaq, Shari‛a – Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
500. 
 
11 
Moving on to the practical comments, one of those most frequently given was the combination of 
“too much effort” or “too difficult”, as well as lack of ownership by or academic research kudos for 
the Muslim respondents. Tied to this was also the suggestion of either paying them for answering 
the survey or offering co-authorship. Taking the last matter first, one can say that while author lists 
of 20 or more persons are no rarity in scientific publications, they are rather unusual in social 
sciences and particularly so in law; in any event merely answering the survey would not have meant 
involvement in the evaluation of the answers and the drafting of a coherent manuscript as opposed 
to an edited collection of all questionnaires. Co-authorship with 25 persons, had everyone merely 
answered the survey, was thus not a realistic option. The other remarks which basically say you 
cannot ask academic colleagues to waste a major amount of time on supporting another academic’s 
research, especially if they themselves are labouring under the regime of research assessment 
exercises such as the REF (Research Excellence Framework) in the UK, without getting academic 
recognition themselves they could profitably use in the REF etc., or at least some other form of 
(pecuniary) consideration or compensation, are in substance unanswerable from an analytical point 
of view: It may really have been asking too much, and given the related issue of the apparent 
absence of ready-made sources that my Muslim colleagues could have used to answer the survey, 
there may be a systemic reason for it, too. This may also apply to the contention that what I had 
asked them to do was “too difficult”. However, it does not really explain the lack of any kind of 
reply by the vast majority of colleagues: The polite and even in a European context completely 
acceptable response would in my view have been to say something along the lines of “this project is 
fascinating and I wish I could help you but alas I am snowed under with numerous other 
commitments” or words to that effect. We all get requests from time to time that we feel we cannot 
or do not want to fulfil because we do either not have the time and/or resources or simply are not 
interested; that is nothing unusual in an academic’s life. Whether there was an unspoken cultural 
reservation or reluctance to state this so openly at work is again not clear; from personal experience 
especially in the (Gulf) Arab environment it is apparently not uncommon there to employ total 
silence as a supposedly non-confrontational way of saying “thanks, but no thanks”, so one cannot 
deny that there might have been an element of that involved. This would match the one cultural 
comment that saying “I don’t know” was not part of Muslim culture. A different issue is what this 
says about the styles of as well as the potential and the range of fields for cooperation by and with 
Muslim colleagues in cross-cultural projects in general. The suggestion that a different format with 
more explanations might have been required was unclear: More explanations would one the one 
hand have meant that the respondents would have had to read even more text, with the exact aim 
and substance of that text left uncertain, and on the other hand it would not have changed any of the 
burden of answering all the questions in the survey. 
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Another mixed practical/cultural aspect was the comment that in Muslim and particularly in Arab 
environments, person-to-person contact is vital if not indispensable if one wants to achieve results 
effectively. One comment aptly named this: “Muslims scholars as gatekeepers”. “Cold letters” were 
thus considered inadvisable. That fact had been known to me and was borne in mind from the 
beginning. The overwhelming majority of direct contacts who were sent the questionnaire were 
known to me previously and I to them, from conferences, seminars, research group membership etc. 
Hence this aspect cannot have had a major impact on the outcome. In itself, this cultural trait can 
nonetheless present an obstacle to setting up research networks with colleagues in the Muslim/Arab 
world. It does, of course, also militate in principle against the concern expressed by the non-
Muslims at ODU that respondents may have been worried about how their anonymity would be 
safeguarded. Nothing would have prevented any respondents from sending a hard copy or USB 
version in an unmarked postal envelope. In any event, although from a research ethics perspective 
these days more precautions are taken than was previously thought necessary, it bears remembering 
that what the respondents were asked to do was not to divulge sensitive personal data but to answer 
hypothetical legal scenarios. Anonymity, as mentioned above, was more of an issue when it came to 
evading the attention of the state authorities; yet even then I was not entirely certain how answering 
legal matters under Shari’ah law could be seen as a subversive activity, even if it involved engaging 
with a Western, non-Muslim person or institution. Indeed, one Iranian colleague had repeatedly 
corresponded with me openly by email lambasting the situation in Iran – if anything, that colleague 
would by then already have been in the cross-hairs of any Iranian intelligence service unit.  But then 
the general level of fear pervading these countries is something one cannot accurately judge as an 
outsider who lives and works in safety. 
 
Insofar as comments advised having used practitioners – such as muftis – instead, and not scholars, 
I found that comment partly self-defeating since the same commentators acknowledged that 
practitioners would very likely have a more limited understanding of the Shari’ah because in their 
daily practice the state-sponsored laws may have played a larger role than the Shari’ah law proper; 
in addition, the comment above regarding the relative prominence of family law in the daily 
practice even of academic scholars would certainly have had an impact in this context as well. Last 
but not least, since I did not know any muftis personally I would have run afoul of the above-
mentioned personal contact barrier unless I would have used my personal contacts to approach 
muftis known to them. However, given that even the colleagues of the academic contacts who had 
passed them on within their networks failed to react to this sort of personal recommendation I 
remain unconvinced that the indirect personal avenue would have had promising results. 
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So, to sum up, the only comment category that would produce an unanswerable picture is the one 
where the Muslim colleagues thought it was too much to ask without some form of either academic 
or pecuniary compensation, or could not be interested for other, unknown reasons. None of the 
other reasons that appeared to find crucial flaws in the survey seem ultimately convincing as a 
sufficient explanation for the failure of the vast majority of respondents to reply at all, although I 
admit that I am, of course, somewhat biased in that respect. 
 
Individual pre- and post-symposium comments 
 
A number of people sent emails before or after the IALS presentation, and they shed further light on 
the matter. I will reproduce them here without further comment, since they are themselves 
thoughtful comments on the presentations or on related issues as such, they speak for themselves 
and lastly they do not highlight anything with which I would either disagree or which I have not 
already addressed above. One non-Muslim Islamic scholar working in the UK, MS9, who could not 
attend, wrote the following shortly before the IALS symposium: 
 
I am so sorry I am going to miss your paper at the IALS …. However, I find your efforts very exciting, 
and the results unsurprising, as you are asking people to address the key issue that many of us are 
struggling with: in law. For, at the end of the day, where is the boundary of the 'intolerable' as 
identified by Twining in his 2009 book on Human Rights, Southern Voices (p. 218), as in a secular 
context we are constantly demanding that Muslims put God's law below the state's law? 
That, I found, is the boundary that many people as individuals are not willing to cross, and are not 
addressing as professionals as a result. Hence, I guess, the purposeful – not perplexed I assume - 
silence of your intended respondents. And in our secularism-dominated, even atheism-inclined 
environments, we forget all too fast that denying the existence of any higher entity (however named, 
that is a different controversy and problem) is what is really intolerable to many people.  
I engaged for the past few years with Muslims in debates about their understanding of 'haram' – that 
did not help, at first, as many Muslims say drinking is haram, and then drink. So the question became: 
what is really really haram – and we know the answer: getting stone drunk and forgetting God exists! 
So here is the boundary. 
I tested this in a different cultural context and asked Japanese colleagues what their language has as 
tools to express something totally unacceptable and completely obnoxious and intolerable. To my 
surprise, without me prompting in any form, what came out from those discussions with people who 
allegedly have no religion was that the Japanese terms for intolerability all link in some form to a 
denial of connectivity, in other words, the rejection of a basic perception that we humans are not 
completely autonomous and that there is something higher 'out there'!  
In a recent conference at the new MPI department on Law and Anthropology in Halle, we connected 
this to the debates about individual agency. Out came some really interesting findings, at least for me: 
individual agency is located on a spectrum between the theoretical possibility of absolute autonomy 
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on the one side and the theoretical possibility of complete predetermination on the other side. Reality 
is somewhere in between. So neither are humans devoid of agency, nor is God, however imagined, 
completely in control. It is this, I suspect, that your respondents avoid addressing through their silence.  
 
Two Muslim scholars working in the UK and who attended the IALS seminar, MS10 and MS 11, 
sent separate remarks by email. MS10 wrote: 
 
I enjoyed your presentation very much and learned a great deal from it. I have worked with 
communities globally for over a quarter century. While I agree with what [MS11] says, one thing to 
keep in mind is that your form asks for people to respond on Sharia applications. While this may be 
possible for some academics to answer, I am not sure that many Muslim lawyers on the ground will 
have thought it through that way or whether they would know who to ask for help in order to answer 
this question. According to my experience people respond better to personal questions but are very 
lackadaisical about filling forms. The culture is more oral than written. Also, Muslim clerics do not, to 
my knowledge, make this distinction between Sharia and law. In my interviews, I found a great deal of 
confusion about these issues in the field. Generally, people in those cultures do not respond readily to 
filling forms. I feel sad because it represents a lost opportunity. From my own research on my 
doctorate, I found that meeting people personally and following them each time yielded the best 
results. Often people would give me appointments and not turn up. In other cases a number of requests 
were met with non-responses. This was not only with Muslims but also other non-Western institutions 
and individuals. 
 
MS11 had written prior to that the following email, to which MS10 referred: 
 
Your lecture continues to reverberate in my mind for several reasons – but mostly because of the 
resonances I felt about your complaints regarding the Muslim religious scholars.  I thought the man at 
the end of the table who spoke about "epistemological" and "ontological" problems and issues 
concerning overweening cultural differences between the West and the Islamic world, was wordy (I 
always feel insecure when the e and o words are used - having to remind myself about their meaning 
and not being sure that the person using them means the same!) and possibly over-defensive, it had 
some merit although you seem[ed] not to think so at the time.  However, overall I am entirely with 
you when you expressed your frustration and puzzlement at the lack of response from the scholars.  I 
don't think academic competitive zeal or the use of certain words are sufficient reason for the 
silence.  There is something else going on here that needs to be thought through […].  
 
Conclusion 
 
The survey project was intended to find common ground, if possible, between Islamic and secular 
legal scholars in order to arrive at common approaches to the same problems that beset every 
society, and increasingly also the inhabitants of the global village. A conversation of sensible minds 
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on all sides is more necessary than ever to pave the way for an admittedly slow, arduous but steady 
march to a better understanding between our societies and moral as well as legal reference systems, 
and someday, maybe, to a state approaching polyphonic harmony. The constant news, for example, 
about the atrocities committed by a band of criminals who do not shrink from committing the 
blasphemy of trying to erect an Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq through the use of unimaginable 
cruelty that would have made Muhammad weep (who himself was no stranger to taking military 
action in the name of Islam in its early days), the reports about Islamist unrest in Egypt and its 
brutal repression by the new regime, and not least the accounts of recurring global Islamist terrorist 
scares have – and it must be said here so bluntly – poisoned the relationship between the Muslims 
and the rest of the world. Because of the actions of a relatively small number of reckless, socially 
disenfranchised and often criminal hotheads who use Islamic scriptures, both the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, for their immoral purposes, and not least because of the perceived absence of vociferous 
public protests in many Muslim communities against such deluded ideas, all Muslims have now 
been put under general suspicion. The voice of the moderate section in Islam needs to be heard 
much louder, and at root level. Muslims should not simply rely complacently on their senior 
religious figures to issue some well-grounded fatawa when some new disaster has struck, nor would 
it be wise of them to risk the non-Muslim scholars of Islamic law and culture explaining their world 
to the outside for them.  
 
However, if and when they want to talk to non-Arabic speakers and non-Muslims, they need to 
speak their language, not just in the literal sense, but also in the conceptual meaning. This in turn 
requires a dialogue that does not stop at taboos as mentioned in the email by MS9 above. The 
discussion between religious and secular participants to the conversation cannot take place solely on 
the ground of one side: The Muslims cannot simply argue the sanctity of the Qur’an and the Sunnah 
as a non-negotiable factum to avoid any sort of critique, nor can the secularists refuse to engage 
with religion-based laws. This is why the maqāṣid and the related rules under Islamic jurisprudence 
are so important, because they embody the essence of the ethical principles of Islam, and this allows 
a direct ethical comparison to secular ethics-based rules, obviating the otherwise unhelpful 
emphasis on first and last questions of religion and secular – or indeed non-Muslim religious – 
ideologies. 
 
The violence which currently and regrettably dominates the global public impression of Islam in the 
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st
 century will probably not abate soon. It is thus imperative that like-minded people of all walks 
of life from the different communities join efforts to clear a common ground from the rubble of 
sectarianism and violent discord, on which the defunct and destroyed house of wisdom, the bayt al-
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hikma, can be rebuilt as a new home of wisdom for all. There is a lot of debris to be cleared away 
before that can happen, and some will try to tear down the new foundations before the work is done. 
Yet, there is no alternative to keeping on hoping and working for a new house under the roof of 
which we can all find shelter and peace, to turn our minds away from the frailties and imperfections 
of human nature and towards the Perfection that we all strive and seek to find, each in our own 
ways. I shall therefore end this paper with an Arab proverb in point: 
 
Success is never final, failure is never fatal. It is courage that counts.
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13
 Hussain Mohammed al-Amily, The Book of Arabic Wisdom, 2005, 161. 
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Annex I 
 
 
Research project 
 
Maqasid al-Shari’ah and general principles of law in secular legal systems 
 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
This questionnaire is meant as a case-based contribution to a wider research project on the topic of 
whether Shari’ah law solutions to common scenarios in private, criminal and public law differ in 
argument and/or result from those reached in secular legal systems, and if so, how. The secular 
jurisdictions I will look at are Germany and England & Wales. To my knowledge, nothing like this 
has been undertaken before and you would be participating in an effort to enhance the mutual 
knowledge about the respective systems. 
 
In this questionnaire I have omitted any questions which relate to the obviously controversial fields 
such as the position of women or anything to do with freedom of religion and expression. The 
scenarios are taken from everyday situations as they can arise in any legal system and have a 
bearing on the way that system’s general legal principles affect the solution to a case. Some of them 
are based on real cases decided in Germany and/or England and Wales. 
 
This survey is entirely anonymous. The data will be collected, stored and used in a way which is 
intended to make it impossible to trace answers back to any individual who participated in the 
survey. In any event, the raw data will be treated in strict confidence and the materials will be stored 
in a secure location. You may declare whether you are available for a possible follow-up interview 
(in English) – but that is entirely voluntary. 
 
Please read the problem scenarios below carefully and answer the questions under pure Shari’ah law, 
NOT the law of the state you live or work in, giving a brief indication of how you arrive at the 
conclusion, and the result. Please assume that only Shari’ah law applies in all of those cases. If there 
are alternative answers depending on certain circumstances or based on different legal reasons, 
please give all possible answers pointing out which circumstances/reasons are relevant. Enter the 
answer directly under each question. 
 
The results of the research will be published in due course and your institution will receive a copy 
of the publication which it may make available to anyone interested in the outcome, whether they 
participated in the survey or not. 
 
Thank you very much for your support. 
 
 
Professor Michael Bohlander 
Chair in Comparative and International Criminal Law 
Director of Islam, Law and Modernity 
Durham Law School 
18 
General issues 
 
 
1. Country/ies where you received your training in Shari’ah: 
 
2. Which school of law did you generally follow in your answers (Please tick)? 
 
O Hanafi O Maliki O Hanbali O Shafi’i O Jafari  O Other: 
 
O I used various schools – in this case please mention the school(s) used under each question. 
 
3.  I am available for interview:   O Yes – please give your email address: 
 
O No 
 
 
 
 
Private Law 
 
 
4. A and B agree that A sells 500 kg of “Whitefish” to B for a price of 1,000 $. Both A and B think 
that Whitefish is a seawater fish. However, in reality Whitefish is a freshwater fish and as such 
unusable for B’s purposes. B refuses to pay the purchase price. Can A demand the purchase price 
from B? 
 
5.  A is visiting a flower auction in Tuliptown. At the auction, he sees his friend B and waves his 
hand at him. The auctioneer thinks A has made a bid on the current lot and awards the lot to A, 
because bids are made by raising one’s hand. A did not know that. The auctioneer demands payment 
of the lot price of 10,000 $ from A. Does A have to pay? 
 
6. A and B have been living together in the same house as a couple without being married for 30 
years. A wants to make sure that B is financially independent when he dies and assigns her an 
endowment of 1,000.000 $ in his will. When A dies, his heirs refuse to pay the endowment to B. 
Can B demand payment? 
 
7. A is a prostitute. She agrees with B to spend a night with him for a price of 1,000 $. The next 
morning, B refuses to pay. Can A demand payment? 
 
8. A enters B’s grocery shop. At the entrance door a salad leaf lies on the floor and A slips on it, 
breaking his leg. Can A demand payment of damages for a) the medical bills and b) for pain and 
suffering? 
 
9. A lends his friend B a hedge-trimmer. B takes it home and the next day, when C comes to visit 
him, he sells the hedge-trimmer to C, saying that it is his own, which C believes. 
 
a) Can A demand the hedge-trimmer back from C? 
b) Would it make a difference if B had stolen the trimmer from A’s house? 
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10. A and B agree that A should redecorate B’s living room with new wallpaper for a price of 500 $. 
A sends one of his employees, C, to do the job. C has a reputation as a very trustworthy and 
competent worker. By accident, he hits a Ming Vase which was standing on a table in B’s living 
room; the vase is worth 20,000 $. The vase is destroyed. Can B demand damages to the amount of 
20,000 $ from A? 
 
11. A owns a marketing firm. For one of his projects, he uses B’s picture on an internet page without 
B’s consent. B is a famous TV celebrity. Can B demand damages from A for the use of his picture? 
 
12. A sells B a painting called “Sunset over the fields”, which both think is by the famous painter 
John Smith, for 100,000 $. A has a report from an expert stating that it is from that painter. However, 
after B has paid the price and taken the picture home, it emerges that the picture was in fact painted 
by George Smith, a much less famous nephew of John Smith, something which neither A nor B 
knew. Can B demand the purchase price back from A? 
 
13. A and B agree that B will cut down the trees in A’s garden for a price of 1,000 $. While B’s 
employee C is cutting down a large oak tree, some little children are playing in the garden, among 
them A’s 8-year-old nephew D, who is on a visit.  D is hit by a large branch which C had not cut 
down properly. By the time the cause is established the limitation period of liability in tort has 
expired; however, the limitation period for liability under contract has not. Can D (through his legal 
guardian) demand damages for a) medical bills and b) for pain and suffering from B? 
 
 
 
Criminal Law 
 
 
14. A wants to import illegal drugs into the country. He takes a suitcase with the drugs to the 
customs area at the airport. While he waits, B exchanges the suitcase with his own which looks 
exactly alike, at a moment when A is not looking. B then takes the drugs through customs. Is A 
liable for importing illegal drugs? 
 
15. A has a fight with B and wounds him seriously. B is taken to hospital in an ambulance. Is A 
liable for B’s death in the following scenarios? 
 
a) The ambulance is hit by another car by accident. 
b) The ambulance is hit by another car whose driver intentionally drove into the 
ambulance in order to kill himself. 
c) B is treated for the wounds but develops an infection which is overlooked by the 
doctors due to lack of proper regular checks, and it results in his death. 
d) B is treated for the wounds. A doctor tries out a new antibiotic which he knows has 
not yet been officially approved; B has an allergic reaction and dies. 
 
16. A shoots B, thinking he is C. Is A liable for the murder of B? 
 
17. A shoots at B with intent to kill; due to being a poor marksman he misses and hits C, who stands 
next to B. C dies. Criminal liability of A? 
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18. A and B are drug users. Both are fully aware of what they are doing. A fills a syringe with heroin 
and gives it to B, who injects himself. Is A liable for B’s death in the following scenarios? 
 
a) B dies from the injected heroin directly after injecting himself. 
b) B becomes unconscious and A leaves him alone in the flat. B dies an hour later from 
the injected drugs. Had A called an ambulance, B could have been saved. 
 
19. A and B are members of opposing gangs. One day they have a shootout in a parking lot when 
they try to kill each other. One of A’s bullets hits passer-by C and kills him. A can escape, but B is 
arrested. Is B liable for C’s death? 
 
20. A tells B to kill C for him. What is the liability of A in the following scenarios? 
 
a) B shoots at C, but misses and hits D, who is killed. 
b) B shoots at D, whom he thinks is C. D is killed. 
c) As in b), yet when B realizes his error, he seeks out the real C and kills him, too. 
 
21. A wants to kill B. What is the liability of A in the following scenarios? 
 
a) A takes aim at B, takes the safety off and puts the finger on the trigger. However, he 
then has second thoughts and gives up. 
b) A takes aim at B, takes the safety off and puts the finger on the trigger. Just when he 
is about to pull the trigger, he hears a police siren and thinks he has been found out. He gives 
up. 
22. A has killed B in a car accident. He is convicted of negligent homicide and given a fine. After 
the judgment has become final and the fine is paid, it emerges that A had actually intended to kill B 
by staging the accident. Can A be tried again for intentional homicide, which carries a mandatory 
life sentence? 
 
 
Public Law 
 
 
23.  A applies in good faith to the government for a large grant of money to start a business. The 
government approved the grant and paid the funds into A’s account. A spends all the money on 
materials needed for the business and sets up his business as planned. Three months later, the 
government realises – correctly – that it made an error and that A was not eligible to obtain funding 
under its business promotion programme. It asks him to pay the money back. Does A have to return 
the funds? 
 
24. A has a house on a piece of land which has its own water supply from a well on the same land. 
The land is not connected to the public water supply or sewerage system. The local public water 
authority asks A to pay water and sewerage charges. A argues he does not have to pay because he is 
not connected to the public system. Does A have to pay? 
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25. As in question 24., but now the public water authority demands that A connect his land to the 
public water supply and sewerage. Does A have to comply? 
 
26. A’s house stands on a hillside right next to an electric power station. In cases of heavy rain, the 
water from the roof of A’s house flows directly into the basement of the power station, causing the 
danger of an electricity outage for the entire town; this has already happened once. The local 
government decides to tear down A’s house to stop the danger of a recurrence of such an event. A 
objects. Can the local government tear down the house nonetheless? 
 
27. The town of Amalgam has a large plot of land which it wants to sell to a developer who will 
build a supermarket for the local community on it. It opens a public bidding process. Several people 
apply, among them A, who is the brother of town councillor B who sits on the panel that decides 
who is to be awarded the bid. A does not live in Amalgam. A’s bid is exactly the same amount and 
quality as that of C who has lived in Amalgam all her life. A is awarded the plot. C asks for judicial 
review of the award and argues that the award was unlawful because B should not have been a 
member of the panel. Will she be successful? 
 
28. A has been in negotiations for some time with the town of Anywhere over the purchase of a 
large plot of land which is meant to be developed into a residential area. The mayor of Anywhere 
has consistently assured A that the planning process to dedicate the land for building homes was 
almost finished. A buys a number of properties which he intends to develop and sell for a profit. A 
few months later the town council decides not to develop the land after all. The plots which A had 
bought at a price that reflected their potential for development are now essentially worthless. Can A 
demand damages for his financial loss from the town? 
